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The problem of financing corporate growth by long-term loan
is a subject seriously disputed among corporate executives. Before
the big "Credit Crisis" in 1970, American companies were moving
overwhelmingly in the direction of more debt and more leverage. As
a result of the "Credit Crisis," however, many American companies
were hard hit by the fixed interest charges.
Hong Kong is a Chinese society and in many ways the Chinese
in business here are westernized; corporate financial executives
particularly, are mostly educated in line with western thinking.
However with respect to the use of long-term debt, Hong Kong comp-
anies in spite of the low cost of debt capital, seldom carry long-
term loan in their financial structures, as do their western counter-
parts.
This thesis is an investigation of the causes of the above
mentioned differences in the attitudes of management in Hong Kong
and in the United States. We attempted to judge these differences
from a political, economic, and social point of view.
We found that conservatism and political uncertainty are the
main factors which affect the decision of the Hong Kong business
people tow,rard financing long-term investment through debt o Another
3significant difference is the tax factor; Hong Kong has a rnucn lower
corporate tax than the U.S., so the advantage of using debt in Hong
Kong is not so significant,
The extent to which a company should be involved in long--
term loans, and thus maximizing profit, is really a question to be
judged on terms of individual cases. There is no model for the most
appropriate debt-equity ratios for a particular industry or for a
particular company. A thorough understanding of the business
political and social environment must be reached before a decision
is made. The policy of debt-equity ratio should be more flexible
and needs to be revised according to changes which affect the financial
environment. However, on the whole, we would like to encourage the
large corporations in Hong Kong, especially the public utilities, to
experiment some what with the practice of debt-equity ratio and in
general to be more aggressive in financial management.
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11.0 INTRODUCTION
The moderate use of debt is a sound approach to finance an
enterprise. Debt is relatively inexpensive to the enterprise
that is, debts are paid out of earnings before taxes. It is a
very difficult problem to find what should be a moderate use of
debt. As an enterprise adds debt to its capital structure, it may
encounter increasing difficulty in interesting other prospective
creditors, until it mixes the debt it has-already acquired with
more equity, or investor capital. The shareholders, too, will
become uneasy, as more and more debt is acquired, for the obvious
reason that the owners' share in the residual earnings stream,
i.e., the earnings stream that is remaining after all operating
expenses, interest charges, and taxes have been paid, may become
less and less.
In spite of the importance given to the use of debt-equity
ratios by a great many corporate borrowers, surprising little evid-
ence of debt policy is found in the literature of business management.
The ratio of debt to equity as well as the sources of funds are
determined by financial policies. These policies vary among indust-
ries as well as among companies within each industry. We are not
going to suggest any appropriate debt-equity ratio for any particular
industry, rather we shall consider a variety of factors which influence
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the choice of debt as a means to finance corporate growth . The
comparison is made between selected Hong Kong companies and those
similar companies in the United States.
1.1 Objective and Scope of Study
The problem of financing long term needs with debts is always
a matter of dispute among company directors. For many companies,
the debt-capacity decision is very important because of its influence
on the margins of profitability and also on the solvency of the
companies. No matter how financially strong some of the companies
are, the subject of debt policy is treated with utmost care.
American companies have generally been regarded as the pioneer
of modern financial management. The last decade has seen the largest
U.S. corporations become more and more leveraged. The U.S. corpor-
ations moved overwhelmingly towards more debt and more leverage, and
consequently, towards capital structures that include as little equity
as possible. As a result of the recession in 1970, those heavily
leveraged companies had the problem of servicing debt for many
companies the burden entailed in paying interest at the prevailing high
rates and of meeting scheduled debt repayments were enough to create
severe financial strains.
It is our opinion that Chinese are more conservative in adopt-
ing new thoughts and new techniques. Hong Kong has a majority of
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Chinese inhabitants. The business community, altnougn, nas long
been influenced by foreign enterprise, yet the characteristics of
the Chinese type of management still prevail. Chinese do not like
to borrow if they can afford to finance from internal sources.
They regard borrowing as a matter of losing face.
The purpose of this study is to compare the attitudes of the
business people in Hong Kong companies with those in U.S. companies
towards the debt-equity policy,
1.2 Methodology
Since our interest was to compare the degrees of debt used by
corporations in Hong Kong and the United States, our investigation
was directed towards financial aspects of the companies. Personal
interviews with the companies' executives were the most important
part of our investigations. Thus, an interview guide was designed,
to assure the procurement of all necessary information. This
interview guide is shown in Appendix I.
In addition to the primary data that could be obtained through.
personal interviews, certain secondary materials were collected from
the companies' annual reports, the Year Book of the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange Limited and from Hong Kong Government publications. A
very detailed financial report and data were found in Fortune, and
4
partinent books and articles relating to our subject were referred
to in preparing this thesis.
52.0 HONG KONG
201 The Characteristics or me Hong Hong nuonuiny
2.11 Past Performance
When Hong Kong was occupied by the British in 1941, it was
described as "a barren island with hardly a house upon it"(1).
Since then, it has become an entrepot for trade with China. This
continued until the Second World Wear. By then, Hong Kong had only
a small amount of industry--shipping, ship repairing and certain
manufacturing. However, after the Second World V,ar, a modern in-
dustrial force emerged in Hong Kong within a relatively short period,
and marked our shifting from an entrepot to an industrialised city.
It is unofficially estimated that national income per capita in
Hong Kong now approaches that of Southern Europe. In Asia, it lags
only behind Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Singapore(2). Alt houi
this does not project the Colony into the ranks of fully developed
economics, it does place it well on the way.
Many factors may account for the Colony's economic success:
first and obviously is the Colony's close knowledge of international
trends, because of its excellent communication facilities and
geographical setting. Local industrialists are in possession of
high degree of adaptibility towards change.
The second factor is the flood of Chinese refugees into Hong Kong
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during the period of 1947- 53. There is a common saying treat,
when the Communists took over China, the politicans went to Taiwan
and the businessmen went to Hong Kong"(3). The industrialists from
Shanghai and other cities brought their capital and technology along
with them to Hong Kong. It is they who first began to industrialise
Hong Kong.
The third factor is Hong Kong's willingness to assume business
risks. Local manufacturers are used to living with, and making the
best of sudden shocks. Examples are the Korean War, during which
the U.S.A. forbade the import of all goods of Chinese origin and
the United Nations forbade strategic goods to be imported into
China. This created a huge demand for Hong Kong Goods. Further, as
most of the population in our working force were once refugees, or,
at least their parents had been refugees, they tend to be very highly
motivated. They are always willing to take a risk, with little to
lose and much to gain. The change of government in lvlainland China in
1949 brought forth a huge inflow of cheap labor and capital to
Hong Kong. Many of these refugees were entrepreneure who were
ready to assume risks and to explore new markets and experiment with
new products, raw materials and production techniques, The pa-pa
and ma-ma type of company is a main characteristic of the Hong Kong
small industrial sectors.
The fourth factor has been taxation of Hong Kong in favor of
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profit making and investment, Although wages have gone up substant-
ially in recent years, the rise in wage rates has lagged behind the
growth of the total national income. The standard rate of salary
and profit tax is 15 per cent(4). There is no full income tax, no
capital gain tax or surtax(5). Most companies can fully recover
the money they invested within three to four years. Free entry and
leave of capital, and quick recovery of capital investment have
attracted many overseas investors who in: .turn aided the growth of
the Hong Kong economy.
Finally, for a long time, Hong Kong has been enjoying cheap and
adequate supplies of food, water, and other basic raw materials from
Mainland China. She also willing to take up any kind of job that cm
give them better pay. This explains why Hong Kong can effectively
compte with other countries in overseas markets.
2.12 Present Performance
Hong Kong's development has been phenomenal. It is also the
world's only example of development without planning. But now the
high-flying is over and the Colony is coming down to earth. In
the seventies, Hong Kong faces serious external problems which
simply did not exist in the buoyant period of international trade,
sparked by the Kennedy Round. It now faces murderous competition
from developing countries in Asia with lower labor costs, while
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reckoning with protectionist policies from its major markets overseas.
And both of these come against a background of unstable international
finance.
2,13 Industrial Development
The growth and development of Hong Kong's industries have been,
on the whole, responsive to initiatives and demands overseas, and not
deliberately conceived. The growth has come in those quite narrowly
defined industrial sectors, which Hong Kong is well suited to exploit.
Among those industries which have shown dramatic growth are electronics,
plastics wigs, watches and clothes. The wig industry rose and fell
within a few years. The electronics industry has developed most rapidly
in recent years. Beginning in 1959 with two factories which assembled
transistor radios from imported parts, there are now more than 280
factories which manufacture transistor radios, television sets and
parts, computer memory systems and other electronic components. Most
recently, Hong Kong has turned to prepackaged electronic models and
desk calculators.
2.14 Future Industrial Problems
In the future, internal problems will be more troublesome than
external problems. The major internal problems are the shortage of
of land, scarcity of skilled labor, and over-concentration of production
in a few sectors and few export markets. Table I shows the external
9
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10
trade of Hong Kong. Hong Kong has moved out or the category of low
cost labor (though by rich country standards, wages are still
attractive), and now faces stiff competition from. low wage countries
such as Taiwan and South Korea. In December 1971, Hong Kong decided
do follow the Pound and revalued the Hong Kong dollar against the
American Dollar by 8.57 per cent, thus increasing the cost of its
exports to its major markets in the U.S.A. and the E.E.C. When
the Pound fell again, in June and July, 1972, Hong Kong took an
unprecedented course. In July 1972, it tied the Hong Kong dollar
temporarily to the U.S. dollar, and floated it against the Pound.
In view of the quotas and restrictions of foreign trade, there.:
is also serious argument of whether or not Hong Kong should still
maintain its laissez faire policy.
2,15 Government Policy
Hong Kong does not have an assured future. The lease on the New
Territories and Kowloon is due to expire in 1997. However, Hong Kong's
existence depends largely on China's calculation of the Colony's real
usefulness, rather than on a treaty concluded a century ago. Peking
maintains that Hong Kong and Macu are part of China, and the problem
of their return "will be settled in an appropriate way when conditions
are ripe"(6). China has filed claim in the United Nations that these
places should not be considered colonies, which could lead to independ-
ence or self-government in the future. The British tax-payers can
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only be convinced to spend money on colonies on their way to indepena
ence, but not on a colony without a bright future. This is why the
Government is reluctant to initiate grandiose development schemes
or economic planning.
Under the laissez faire type of policy, there is a tendency on the
part of the Government to intervene only when things go very wrong.
Until 1964, the Government did not intervene even to regulate the
Colony's banking industry, and even then not quite in time wholly to
diver a crisis. The latest example is the stock market collapse.
The Goverment's reason behind this type of policy of non-inter-
vention is that
... undue government interference with private sector
initivative, whether it is to be deliberate or through
a failure to appreciate fully the implication of a
particular course of action, particularly at excessive
a acceleration of the rate of growth of public expend-
iture, runs the very real risk of impairing the econ-
omy's long-term growth prospects on which all the hopes
for the future depend,
as cited by the Financial Secretary in his speech during the hrwa
Conference in Managers in Changing Hong Kong Environment,"
November 1973.
The Government's point of view is that the activities wnicn iL
must undertake should be kept to a minimum. Such activities include
the maintenance of law and order, regulation of private activities so
as to protect the public interest, those which are concerned with
12
the provision of services which the private sector is unwilling or
unable to rpovide, and those which are designed to assist individuals
who find themselves in circumstances beyond their control such as
labor disputes. Other than these activities, the Government is un-
willing to get involved. It is doubtful whether the old formula of
lassiez faire can continue to work so well now that the Colony is
moving into a more sophisticated line of output that requires higher
input of both capital and trained experts.
2.2 A General Review of Financial Markets in Hong Kong
During the last decade or so, Hong Kong's position as a financial
centre in the Far East has strengthened greatly. Several factors have
contributed to Hong Kong's position as a leaking financial centre.
Hong Kong has a strong currency, low taxes (15 per cent), high saving
propensity and a free exchange market. Nicholas L. Deak, President of
Deak Co., Inc. stated, The British Colony is flourishing as a
haven for foreign flight capital because of its orderly government,
orderly money management and orderly bank supervision(7).
A survey made by the American Consulate-General indicated a total
private American investment in Hong Kong of US$134 million in 1967.
A further US$26 million was received in 1968, and US$29 million was
expected in 1969 and later(8). This statistic is an example to
indicate the confidence of foreign investors in the expected high
profit of running a business in Hong Kong. Many large corporations
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from all over the world, including banks, have expanaea Lneir ousine
to Hong Kong.
2.21 Money Supply
"As a result of the absence of a central bank and the whole
paraphenalia of monetary investments, money supply is determined by
the portfolio decisions of the commerical banks to an extent that is
perhaps unique to Hong Kong "(9).
Currency in Hong Kong consists of the banknotes of the three
private British exchange banks (the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking
Corporation, the Chartered Bank, and the Mercantile Bank) and
Government issued one-dollars and other subsidiary notes and coins.
The banknotes and Government one-dollar notes/coins have unlimited
legal tender status, while other subsidiary notes and coins have only
limited legal tender status. The currency in circulation is shown
in Table 2.
2022 Banking
Banking and other financial institutions have played a signiricant
role in transforming Hong Kong from an entrepot to a major manufact-
uring centre.
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Source: Hong Kong Monthly vigest OI JLaLisLlcs(census & Statistics)
Department. Hong nong). November, 1973.p. 42
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classified into three large groups. The banks which orginatea in
China form a distinct group and are interested generally in financ-
ing the sales of Mainland products and thereby accumulating foreign
exchange reserves for the People's Republic. The expatriate banks,
on the other hand, specialize in the finance of foreign trade and
primarily, though by no means exclusively, trade with their own
home countries, and have shown reluctance to get involved in any phase
of development financing or domestic business other than the acquist-
ion of deposits. The local Chinese banks are concentrated in property
finance and personal loans where the return is high. The foreign
banks and one or two large local Chinese banks together handle
practically all the business of financing industry, not only in the
supply of working capital but with medium and sometimes long-term
finance on a very considerable scale.
At the end of 1970 there were 73 banks, with 361 branches in
the Colony. Of these banks 32 are foreign banks and have 148 branches.
In April, 1974, the number of banks went up to 74 with 550 branches.
"It is a well known fact that larger banks from abroad have rapidly
displaced the small local banks"(10).
In addition to the banks operating under the Banking Ordinance,
there are twenty-two representative offices of foreign banks. They
are prohibited from engaging in routine banking business, and they
restrict themselves to rendering advisory services both locally and
to clients in their home countries. Tables 3 and 4 show the banks
with offices in Hong Kong.
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TAHLE 3
BANKS WITH OFFICES IN HONG KONG
No of orancnesNo of branches
in inLicensed banks in Hong Kong
Hong KongHong Kong
1. Foreign banks
1Equitable Banking Corporation26The Chartered Bank
First National City Bank 7Hong Kong Shanghai
Four Seas Communications63Banking Corporation
1BankMercantile Bank 3
Indian Overseas Bank 12Algemene Bank Nederland
International Bank of Commerce 5American Express International
1Korea Exchange BankBanking Corporation 3
2Malayan Banking BerhadBangkok Rank 4
1National Bank of PakistanBank of America 4
Overseas-Chinese Banking1Bank of India
2Corporation2Bank of Tokyo
2Overseas Union Bank1Bank Ne ga ra Indonesia
1Sanwa BankBanque Belge 5
1Sumitomo BankBanque de I' In do chine 4
1Underwriters BankBanque Nationale de Paris 5
22 United Commerical BankChase Manhattan Bank
1United Overseas Bank2Chung Khiaw Bank
Wayfoong Finance 1Deutsch-Asiatische Bank 1
2.uninese malrLLancc nanxs
Nanyang Uommerical Bank1 7Bank of China
National Commerical Bank6 3Bank of Communications
Po Sang BankChina South Sea Bank 15
Sin Hua Trust, SavingsChina State Bank 5
Commerical BankHua Chiao Commerical Bank 74
Yien Yieh Commerical Bank6Kincheng Banking Corporation 5
Chiyu Banking CorporationKwangtung Provincial Bank 7 3
5, Local unine se banKs
Hong Nin Saving BankBank of Canton 33
Bank of East Asia Ka l a h Bank10 3
Chekiang First Bank Kwong On Bank2 7
Commerical Bank of Hong Kong Liu Chong Hing Bank 83
Overseas Trust BankDah Sing Bank 133
Shanghai Commerical BankDa o Heng Bank 6 9
Tai Sang BankFar East Bank 14 3
2 Tai Yau BankHang Lung Bank 1
Union Bank of Hong KongHang Seng Bank 13 3
Hong Kong Chinese Bank United Chinese Bank7 9
Wing Hang BankHK Industrial Commerical 2
Wing Lung BankBank 53
Hong Metropolitan Bank Wing On Bank1 7
17
40 Unincorporated Banks
1Ming Tai Finance Co .1Chan Man Cheong Finance Co .
1Lee Shing
Source: Graham, P. A., Hong Kong's Banks and Financial Institutes,
The Banker, July 1970, P. 752.
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TABLE 4.
BANK REPRESENTATIVE OFFICES IN HONG KONG
Allied Bank International Mitsubishi Bank
Bank Bumi Daya Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of
Bank of Japan New York
Bank of Montreal National Bank of Commerce of Seattle
Bankers Trust Company Overseas Development Bank
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Philippine National Bank
Crocker-Citizens National Bank Royal Bank of Canada
First National Bank of Oregon Swiss Bank Corporation
Habib Bank Swiss Credit Bank
Irving Trust Company Toronto Dominion Bank
Marine Midland Grace Trust Company Union Bank of Switzerland
of New York Wirtschaftsbank Zurich
Source: Graham, P.A. Hong Kong's Banks and Financial Institutes.
The Banker, July 1970. P. 7530
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2.23 Finance Companies
Another notable element of the Colony's money market is the
finance companies which have recently developed their business in
Hong Kong. There are a large number of such organisations, most of
them sponsored by commerical banks. Finance companies owe their
origin to providing hire purchase loans principally for the purchase
of motor vehicles for private and business use. They also provide
personal installment loans. They rely heavily on long-term deposits.
2024 Investment Companies and Insurance companies
There are numerous invest..ment companies in the Colony and
approximately twenty of them are listed on the Colony's stock
exchanges. The provide an excellent channel for investment.
Insurance companies have played an important part in providing
funds for the industrial market of Hong Kong. They also provide
Hong Kong with maritime, warehouse, merchandise and industrial
property, fire, accident and life insurance." At the end of 1970,
there were 210 insurance companies in the Colony. Fifty-five of
these companies are of local origin, while the rest are incorporated
in Britain, the United States, Japan, Phillipines, Ma laysia, France,
Switzerland, and India"(l1).
With the inreasing importance of Hong Kong as a city for foreign
20
trade, maritime insurance is the largest insurance business in
Hong Kongo In addition to the above fields, the insurance companies
are extending their business into workmen's compensation, building
demolition, piling, and construction.
2.25 Stock Market
In the last couple of years, stock market activity has been
very high in Hong Kong. There have excesses, and speculators
have been hurt, but the fundamental fact of the Stock Market is that
it plays a very positive role in the marshalling of funds and re-
sources for the expansion and financing of industry and trade, and
developing the economy. Amechanism has been created whereby when
abuses occur, steps are taken both by the Government and the stock
exchanges themselves to do away with these abuses. Chartl shows
the fluctuation of the Hang Seng index(12).
At present there are four stock exchanges in Hong Kong. The
Government has announced that it will not recognize any new ex-
changes set up before the enactment of the Securities Bill, which
was formally adopted in February, 1974. The bill is expected not
only to restrict the number of stock exchanges, but will also draw
up systematic registration requirements for all dealers, probably
in a new federation of stock exchanges with compulsory membership,
consistent trading hours, and common quotation of all shares. Table 5
gives a general description of the four stock exchanges in Hong Kong.
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Source: Year Book, (Hong Kong stock Exchange, ltd. )1968-1973
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TABLE 5
THE FOUR HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGES
Year of incor-Number of
members (a) poration (b)
1891The Hong Kong Stock Exchange 96
The Far East Stock Exchange 1969188
The Kam Ngan Stock Exchange 1971195
The Kowloon Stock Exchange 171 1972
Source: (a) Ma, Nancy." Hong Kong comes down to earth 1972."p.39
(b) First National City Bank, the Economic Department:
Investment Guide to Hong Kong, 1972.
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2.3 Sources of Funds in Hong Kong
From 1955, we see a growth of saving and fixed deposits in
banking. Statistics from the Government showed the amount of
increase in Table 6. Since there has always been a free exchange
market in Hong Kong, it is not easy to brace the origins of such
deposits. It is believed that a large portion of these deposits
carte from overseas Chinese home remittances passing through the
Colony, and the immigration of capital of Chinese in Southeast Asia.
In addition to this, other sources of funds, such as foreign invest-
ment, bank loans, Government expenditures, the stock market and the
recent issue of bonds to the European market, help to provide funds
for the growth of Hong Kong industrialists.
2q1 Funds from the Mainland 1947- 1952
"During the period 1947- 1953 several hundred industrialists
from Shanghai and other cities in China left China and established
new industries in Hong Kong. Many of them previously transfered some
of their capital out of China "(13).
Early in 1947, Fortune magazine estimated that as much as US$50
million of Chinese wealth had taken refuge in Hong Kong from China,
and that 228 Shanghai concerns had shifted their registry to Hong
Kong(14)o Indeed, the registration of new capital totalling HK$949
million in 1942- 1948 is still the record(15). It has been said
24
TABLE 6
FOREIGN INVESTI+AENT IN HONG KONG MANUFACTURB'JG 1NU!J5 hY
RY COTRY OF ORIGIN
(position as at February 29,1972)
Percent-Total investmentNumber ofCountry of
age(HK$ Million)establishmentsorigin





















* The total number recorded is greater than the true figure of 5U
industrial concerns as some companies represent more than one
foreign interest.
Source: Department of Commerce Industry, Hong Kong (iovernmenL.
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that from 1947 to 1949 the amount which flowed into Hong Kong was
around HK 2,000 million(16). Another study gives a figure of HK$1,000
million as influex in one year, 1949/50(17). These funds were used for
the development of Hong Kong industries in her early years.
2.32 Foreign Investment
Foreign investment, of course, plays an important role as a
source of funds for Hong Kong. In the early sixties, over 60 per
cent of foreign investment was concentrated in the textiles, plastics,
and metal-ware industries. In the late sixties, the electronic
industry emerged as the most favored by foreign investors(18).
Data on foreign investment in Hong Kong is not very complete.
It is commonly known, however, that American capital is dominating a
number of industries, e.g., electronic equipment, toys, and wigs.
In Hong Kong, the only offical data on foreign investment come
from two sources: 1) from the records kept by the Department of
Commerce and Industry on local manufacturing companies which have
foreign capital, and 2) from the records kept by the Company Registry
of all foreign incorporated companies which have established a place
of business in Hong Kong. Statistics demonstrating the amount of
foreign investment are shown in Table 6, and a breakdown of the
foreign incorporated companies operating in Hong Kong by country of
origin is shown in Table 7.
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TABLE 7
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF COMPANIES INCORPORATED OUT-
SIDE HONG KONG WHICH HAS ESTABLISHED A PLACE
OF BUSINESS IN HONG KONG AND REGISTERED
DOCUMENTS UNDER PART XI OF THE
COMPANIES ORDINANCE
(as of March 31, 1971)













Government.Source: company Registry,Hong Kong
272.33 Government Expenditure
When speaking of sources of funds available to the public,
Government expenditures on public works and services are very often
regarded as one of the sources. Public works, health and education
are the major area of public expenditure, and they accounted for
49 per cent of the total expenditure of H02,452 million in 1970-71.
Data on Government expenditure is shown in Table B.
2.34 Bank loans and Bonds
Capital resources allocated through banking intermediaries have
been a very important element in the financing of capital formation
in Hong Kong. "The Hong Kong and Shanghai group (which include both
the Merantile Bank and the Hang Seng Bank) and the Charter Bank
probably still account for roughly 70 per cent of all loans for plant
and equipment"(19).
Table 9 gives the figures for bank loans and investments re-
presenting that part of savings re-invested in the Hong Kong economy
through the intermediaries of banking institutes. Table 10 shows
a comparison of the various deposits and the account of bank loans.
Recently the Eastern Asia Navigation Co., Ltd. issued bonds in
the Euro-market to raise L'S a50 million. The money is used to financE
new ships. It is only the third foray into the Euro-market by big
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TABLE 8
FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
(HK$ Thousand)
Classification 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72
Economic services
Agriculture, fisheries forestry 16,160 16,270 18,150
Mining 4, 130 1,7202, 770
Railway and land transport 81,420 118, 04058,890
Water transport 40, 83 0 44, 43 0311880
Air transport 283730 47,390 71,320
Commerce industry 44,610 49,460 58,150
Reclamation development 16,100 17,990 181240
Sub-total 199,140 257,490 330.9050
Social services
Education 586, 800395,310 497,610
Health 251,960 299.800216, 590
Social security and welfare
services 51, 500 58,160 74,140
Housing resettlement 150,350 180,200 208, 470
Postal services 80, 890 94,020 95,990
Cooperative marketing
organisation 670 930 3,060
Water supply 115,49074,320 168,960
3 7, 800Fire protection 46,95036,680
Sanitation 118,790 142,300993480
Sub-total 1,106,910 1,353,840 1,626,470
General services
General administration 346, 980 417,670 458, 5 50
Defence 87,930 102,990 115,350
Justice 17,200 20,290 21, 650
Police 168,180 177,600 217, 580
Prison 22, 43 0 25,910 31P040
General information services 21,690 20Y240 20,400
sub-total 664, 410 7 64, 700 864, 570
unalloca ble expenditure
Interest repayment on public
debt 5,180 5, 710 4, 760
Pension 55, 050 69, 900 74,520
Advances 890 1,010550
Sub-total 1. 7-20 80129076,160
Total zovernment expenditure 2 02,180 2.452,,190 2,901, 3 80
Source: Hong Kong Social Economic Trends (Census Statistics
Department, Hong Kong, 1968- 1972) p. l00.
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TABLE 9
BANK LIABILITIES AND ASSETS
(HK$ Million)
197219711970
Number of Reporting Banks 737373
Liabilities
2,7422,413Notes in circulation ,151
24,61318,78514,955Deposits
(8,501)Demand (5,317)(4,326)
(7,807)Time ( 6, 407) (7,395)
Saving (8,306)(6,074)(4,222)
8,532Balance due to 4,9803,737





Cash (legal tender notes
466and coins) 3 56 385
11., 3 88 13,7218,633Balance due from
Other banks in Hong Kong (1, 534) (3,105)(2,004)
(10, 616)(9,384)Banks abroad (7,099)
17,72611,836Loans and advances 9,670
115501,081856Investments
(1,051) (1,491)Local (839)
( 30) (59)Other (17)
6,863Other assets 418224,317
LO .32529,48523, 831Total assets
Source: Hong Kong Social Economic Trends (Census Statistics
Department, Hong Kong 1968- 1972). p.94
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TABLE 10
ANALYSIS OF BANK LOANS AND ADVANCIES
(HK$ Million)
As at last day of auarter ended DEC. DEC. DEC.
1970 1971 1972
1. Manufacturing 1,-860 1,979 2,233
(a) textile 678 76 5 786
(i) cotton (449 (462) (425)
(ii) other (229, (303) (360)
(b) footwear and wearing apparel 297 424315
(c) metal products engineering 135 161 191
(d) rubber, plastics chemicals 123 159 156
(e) shipbuilding repair 5039 36
(f) electrical electronics 242 213 269
(g) food 29 43 36
(h) beverages tobacco 2840 43
61 6150(i) printing
(j) miscellaneous 227 218197
2. Agriculture and Fisheries 16 85
(a) fisheries 2 23
12 2 2(b) livestock livestock products
(c) vegetables horticulture 2 1 4
3. Transport Transport Equipment 1,136 2,0631,439
4. Electricity, Gas Telephone 100 144 197
5. Building and Construction 649 1,090723
6. General Commerce 4,1893,474 5,110
(a) import, export wholesale trade 4,7703,257 3,961
(b) retail trade 217 228 340
7. Mining and Quarrying 1 1 16
8. Miscellaneous 2,432 7,0103, 356
(a) hotels, boarding houses catering 106 102 230
(b) financial concerns including banks 1,259535374
(c) stockbrokers 249143 736
1, 8621,367 33746
(l, 030)(d) professionalprivateindividuals(i) for businesspurposes (475) (565)
(ii) for private purposes (892) .1,296) (2,716)443(e) all others 608 1.1049
Total loans and Advances 9,670 11, 836 17,726
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics. (Census Statistics
Department, Hong Kong), November 1973. P.43
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Hong Kong companies. The forerunners were Jardine Matheson and
Hong Kong Land and it is clear that overseas institutes these days
are only interested in anything with 'blue chip' written all over
it, commented the South China Morning Post on February 2, 1974.
But Euro-market as a source of funds, is only available to those
companies who are financially strong and already big in Hong Kong.
Anyway, it is a beginning for Hong Kong companies to look into
foreign money markets. In the future Europe will not be the only
market for the bonds of Hong Kong companies.
2.35 The Stock Market
The recent development of the Hong Kong Stock Market has made
many private firms list on the stock exchange, in order to acquire
more capital from the public. Between 1969 and 1971, around forty--
four issues were newly listed on the Colony's exchanges, involving
a total public subscription of HK$741 million(20). More than
seventy new listings were added since 1972, including major firms
like Slater IiValker Securities Sanko Steamship Sony and Ralli
International. All the new issues were fully subscribed and a few
of them even over-subscribed by forty-five to sixty-seven. The turn=
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11 Figure refers to 17th---51st uecemner
luensus & StatisticsSource: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics November, IVY),
Department, Hong Kong), P.46.
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TABLE 12
INDEX OF SHARE PRICES
unarm Seng Index Far East iNDEX kam Ngan Index.
100)(31.7.64.= 100) (1.4.71=1000)Year/month



















*:Monthl average of Aril--lle cemher
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, November,
Census & Statistics Department, Hong Kong) P. 46.
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2.36 Conclusion
It is our opinion that the use of leverage is not as simple as
gaining a higher rate of return than the fixed payout interest rates.
The decision is based upon personal experience, social condition,
business environment, and political influences.
Thus an understanding of the above sections will help us to
know better the basic reasons which influence the policy of a com-
pany towards long term debts.
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3.0 THE THEORY OF DEBT-EQUITY RATIOS
Sal Defining Debt-Equity Ratio
The term. debt-equity ratio can be defined in two quite differ-
ent ways. One definition includes the current liabilities, and the
other excludes them. The one perhaps most frequently used is the
ratio of long-term liabilities to total equity, preferred and common
stock and surplus. If the amount of debt exceeds the equity, the
index: vill be greater than one if it does not, it will be less than
one. Short-term debt is frequently excluded from these calculations,
though it also provides a leverage effect. Whether it is relevant
to include current liabilities in the calculation of debt-equity r£itiD
or not depends on the size of the company and the nature of its busin-
ess. For large firms, current liabilities r'e quently represent a
small percentage of the financing sources, and to include them in the
calculation would not significantly affect the final index. For firms
in the wholesale and retail trade, a large portion of their capital
is financed with current debt because of greater seasonal fluctuations
in sales volume, so current debt in this case should be included in
the calculation of debt-equity ratio.
The term debt-equity ratio is made up of three words. The
first word, debt, we defin here as long term debt which lasts at
least one year. Its sources may be a commerical bond, an insurance
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company, or a trust fund. Term loans result from direct (and usually
unpublicized) negotiations between borrower and lender. Thus they
are privately placed as contrasted with public sale through the monEy
market. Long-term debt can be subclassified in three ways.
111. Nature of security (mortgage versus debenture bonds),
2. Directness of the obligations (direct debt versus off-
balance-sheet financing), and,
3. Degree of participation (pure debt versus contingency debt)"(1).
The second word, equity, can be used in different ways, but in
corporate finance it means ownership(2). Equity capital raised ex-
ternally is of two main sorts: (a) preferred stock, which is a kind of
preferential but limited partnership, and (b) common stock, which
is full partnership.
The third word, ratio, means proportion. Since a ratio is
made up of two numbers, the numerator and the denominator, a change
in the numerator, or the denominator, or both, may result in a
significant change.




3011 The Characteristics of Debt Versus Equity
Debt, as we know, is the obligation incurred by borrowing.
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Equity is the owner's share of assets. There are distinct differences
between the two in the following four areas:
1. Maturity
Debt comes due, and must be repaid at some time specified in
the argreement between the company and its creditors. Equity on the
other hand, has no date of maturity. When owners invest in a company,
there is no agreement that they will have their initial investment
returned.
2. Claim on income
The claims of creditors are prior to the claim of owners. All
obligations to creditors must be met first, and in some instances
owners may not withdraw profits if those withdrawals would jeopardize
the prior claims of the creditors. If the company has promised to
pay interest on the debt, it must pay the interest regardless of the
level of earnings, or it will face legal action. The interest pay-
ments, are fixed charges. The residual income is then distributed in
the form of withdrawal as in the case of partnership or as dividends
in the case of common stock. Interest payments on debt are limited
to a certain fixed amount. The common stockholders have claim to
any income left over after the exercise of the prior claim of
creditors.
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3. Claim on assets
The claims of creditors on assets are always prior to those of
shareholders. In return for this prior position, the creditors agreE
to seek no more than the principal they have loaned, plus any unpaid
interest. The common stockholders can have whatever is left after
the claims of the preferred stockholders.
. Hight to voice in managerenL
Creditors have no direct vocie in the management of a company,
although they may include certain restrictions in the loan agreement
on management's activities. Also, creditors have no vote in determin-
ing the board of directors of a corporation.
The power to choose the management rests with the common
stockholders. In the case of a corporation this power is exercised
through voting for the board of directors, who in turn appoint the
management.
3.12 Pros and Cons of Using Debt
The use of debt funds offers certain advantages. One advantage
is that the normal cost of debt is lower than the cost of equity
funds. An enterprise with a stable and predictable earnins cap-0
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ability can carry more debt, other factors being constant, than can
the firm with a less predictable earning history or forecast. In
other words, the more stable stream can more consistently cover the
fixed interest charges on borrowed capital. Because debt capital,
when used within judicious limits, is considerably cheaper than
equity capital, there is a clear monetary inducement to using debt.
Primarily, new equity capital raised via a new stock issue is a
more expensive proposition for these reasons:
(a) the additional dividends on the new shares (paid out of
after tax dollars) add directly to the outflow of cash.
(b) the increase in the number of shares results in a perman-
ent drag on growth in earnings per share so, to the extent that
management feels a need to respond to the stockholders interest,
or is concerned about its own stock options, this will be a signigic-
ant consideration.
There is another advantage to employing debt capital which
arises from the fact that charges which attend the use of debt are
fixed, that is to say, they do not increase with increases in the
size of the earnings stream, unless of course more debt is secured
by the enterprise. Using debt capital is know as levering the
earnings stream and can be most advantageous to the stockholders.
If debt capital is employed so as to yield more than the fixed
charges which attend its use, the stockholder benefits from the
lamer net earning stream. Positive leverage is said to have
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occured. If, on the other hand, debt capital is less effectively
employed and does not consistently cover the attendent fixed costs,
negative leverage has occured and the owners suffer reduced net
earning prospects.
A third advantage is that interest payments on debt are de-
ductible for tax purposes, whereas dividend payments on equity are
not. Because of these factors, an increase in the debt component
of total funds tends to lower the average or overall cost of capital.
On the other hand, the use of debt also involves disadvantages.
The most significant of these is that debt interposes a fixed charge
between operating earnings and the amount of income flowing to
shareholders subject to a higher degree of uncertainty. In addition,
common shareholders are exposed to a potential loss of their owner-
ship rights in company assets in the event of default. Because of
this, an increase in the debt component of total financing increases
the cost of equity capital, and hence tends to increase the overall
cost of capital.
There is no general agreement as to the exact way in which these
two opposing effects of increasing debt usage operate. The trad--
itional view is that there does exist some-optimal mixture of debt
and equity for every company or industry at which the company's
overall cost of capital is at a minimum. In this view, the judicious
use of debt up to the optimal level results in a higher average,
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cost of capital. The level itself is determined by two sets o1
factors.
(a) The sensitivity of company earnings to general economic
fluctuations. The more stable earnings are likely to be, the
higher the permissible amount of fixed charges.
(b) The average practice of other firms in the industry.
Financial structures which do not conform to group performance tend
to be suspect. These considerations shape bond ratings and credit
ratings and thereby set the limit on the use of leverage by any
company.
In practice, individual companies within a given industry tend
to follow widely different patterns of debt utilization, and the
question of debt usage remains an area in which formal analysis and
experience have not as yet provided financial planning with firm
guidelines.
3.2 Theory Derived from Different Schools of Thought (A 6urnrlary
of "The Lesson of the Credit Crisis" (4))
In the wake of last year's great crunch there
has been a sea of change in the way corporate
financial officers think about debt. At quite
a few companies heavy leverage has lost its
appeal (5)
The concept of leverage cha: ed as a resui t or the recession,
the Penn Central bankruptcy, and the liquidity crisis in 1970.
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Before that, the U.S. corporate community was moving overwhelmingly
in the direction of more debt and more leverage, and consequently,
toward capital structures that included as little equity as possible.
Between 1960 and 1970, 106 companies out of the 500 biggest industrial
companies had a debt ratio exceeding 40 per cent 16 out of these were
around 60 per cent, and 3, Ling-Temco-fought, General Horst, and
Rapid-American were beyond 80 per cent.
The New Economists who virtually eliminated the threat of
serious recessions and had reduced the risks of doing business, voted
for more debts. There were some non-believers, but their voices were
drowned by so many advocators. However in 1970, almost every company
which had debts was struggling not only to stay competitively fit, but
also to deal with the problem of servicing debt. The high interest
rate together with the requirement to meet the repayment schedule in
time was a problem. The crisis began with the Penn Central bankruptcy,
then the Lockheed, Ling-Temco-Vought, the airlines and a whole string
oT conglomerates. Even after months of easy money, many companies had
to suffer a year or so, before they could gain a sound financial footirg.
The followin things had to be done during this period:
(a) Dividend were cut.
(b) Divisions in which they had invested a great deal had
to be sold to raise cash.
(c) Short term money was borrowed, when in fact what they
wanted was long-term financing.
(d) Many corporate investments were postphoned because of
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lack of cash.
(e) Debt agreement were signed and so saddled them with stiff
restrictions on working capital and the payment of dividends.
3.21 Executives with New Worries
Many executives who learnt lessons because of the recession
last year began to pay more respect to equity. The problem of using
equity which may decrease earning per share seemed to lose its
force. This was reflected in many of the companies' reports in 1970.
Sanford C. Sigoloff, the new President and Chairman of Republic
Corporation, explained its US$14 million loss in 1970. The year's
results basically reflect previous management policies and actions,
which were adopted in a more favourable economic climate with the
expectation that these conditions would continue. Other reports
hinted that their objectives in the next year would be to improve the
balance sheet and to reduce the percentage of debt. The Bangor Punta
report further expressed, The principal objective of corporate policy
throughout the year was to maintain a sound financial position even
at-the expense of earning's.
The advocates of a strong balance sheet ti-ere to be round, as
well. As Chester H. Roth, the Chairman of Kayser-Roth expressed,
The balance sheet is the most accurate measure of a corporation's
strength. Even some conglomerates which were doing fine in 1970
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preached sternly in their annual report on the need to avoid catast-
rophe.
It would be exaggerating to say that the U.S. business community
was shocked by debts and working towards low debt ratio. In 1970,
a record US30.3 billion worth of bonds were issued and this high
level continued in 1971. It is true that these sales were tended to
restructure rather than to increase debt. But there are still a
number of businessmen who feel that their business can safely take
on new layers of debt. Take for instance, Mr. E. Kent Damon, Vice-
President and Treasurer of Xerox who believes that in view of the
profitability of his company, he could increase its present debt
ratio of 29 per cent to around 50 per cent. (Xerox had the highest
percentage of growth in earnings per share, among the 500 largest
industrials.) The Chairman of Bethlehem Steel, Mr. Stewart S. Cort,
said that he could increase his company's debt ratio from 23 per cent
to 30 per cent. He said," I once asked a broker friend of mine why
the marKet a.ilowea the aluminum companieb Lo have forty and fifty per
cent debt. He said, 'Well, they started out that way.' The Dow
Chemical Company had a debt ratio of 47 per cent in 1970. But still,
Carl A. Gerstacker the Chairman said, I can conceive of our going
70 per cent."
3q22 Some Companies Feel high
However. the rush towards higher levels of debt has halted. The
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prevailing atmosphere among the business sector was one of caution.
A survey of thirty large New York companies, conducted by Profit-
Improvement, Inc., a management consulting firm, showed that there
was a lack of enthusiasm towards increasing leverage.
As result of the uneasiness in debt, we see in recent years,
that companies are working towards equity financing. The utilities
are major participants. Out of US$8.7 billion was itself more than
three times the highest annual total reached in the mid 1960's.
The bankruptcy of the Penn Central Transportation Company was
the turning point in businessmen's thinking about debt. Its immed-
iate impact was on the market for commerical paper, i.e., short-
term unsecured notes. There had been continuous growth of the
market since 1960. By May 1970, there was US$32 billion of this
paper outstanding and issued by a number of 575 industrial, tran-
sportation, and finance companies. The bank affiliates had another
US?7 billion outstanding. Penn Central, which had US$82 million
outstanding, went bankrupt on June 21, 1970.
The immediate influence of this was reflected three weeks
later: three billion, or nearly 10 per cent of the commerical paper
which came due, could not be refinanced or rolled over, in the
market. The companies who suffered most were those who had weak
balance sheets and weak profitability in 1970. S.C.M. Corporation,
Evans Products and Great Western United were among those soon pushed
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out of the paper market. The next to suffer were those finance
companies that were subsidaries of individual companies. They were
the Chrysler Financial and Chrysler, both owned by AVCO, and Com-
merical Credit, owned by Control Data. These companies owned huge
amounts of commerical paper with share maturities that began to fall
due almost immediately.
Prior to the credit disaster, almost all outstanaing conuner.Lea
paper was backed up by bank lines of credit. But bank credit lines
are expensive. Many issuers just let their paper volume rise with-
out covering it by credit lines. When Penn Central went into bank-
ruptcy, the banks were at that moment caught in their own tight-
money vise, and were loaned up to the hilt. There were many companies
that found little help from their own friendly bankers.
The country had a narrow escape from a massive coi.iaspe.
What avertod disaster was the immediate intervenLaon
of the Federal Reserve, which began maneuvering on the
weekend of the Penn Central bankruptcy to make add-
itional money available to the commerical banks and
to encourage them to rescue the companies squeezed in
the commerical paper market.
Procedures for making direct loans to corporations were set up
by 'the Fed' should the banks fall short of providing the necessary
funds.
3.23 Bird-Dogging for tsorroviers
Although the crisis of ire cUiiujicicsl paper was over by late
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July, its influence on the ability of companies to obtain money
continued to be widely felt. The financial miseries were of
several kinds.
Money became plentiful in banks and short-term interest rates
fell from their peak of the summer of 1970. The banks now had to
send out their junior officers bird-dogging for new business.
Netrhrtheless the six largest New York banks recorded a very high
volume of bad debts, amounting to US$167 million, a figure which
exceeded the total of the previous five years.
As a result of the painful experience, the bank's credit stand-
ards stayed up, while the interest rates fell.. Many restrictions on
dividends, additional borrowing and working capital were imposed by
the banks on the corporations that wanted loans. Banks also insisted
that loans to the financially weaker customers carry short maturities
This means that the customers in question were more or less contin-
ually living with the threat that terms would be renegotiated or
loans actually called. Sander Associates in 1970 negotiated a bank
loan for US48 million, and the bank required that the loan come
due at the end of the calender year 1971. Technically this can be
considered as long-term debt on the balance sheet of the company-
i.e., any loan that comes due after one year can be so described.
But the effect of the early maturity had a lot of short-term pressure.
Sander in 1970 had cash flow of only US`9 million, and that year was
only marginally profitable. Chances of repaying the debt were
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gloomy. However, in 1971, the company made a new deal with the banks.
Sander paid US$5 million of its loans and had to pay off US$15
million more by July 31. The maturity of the remainder was extended
t.n the next year. so the pressure continues.
The companies suffering from short-term debt began to suost,iLute
longer-term financing for short-term debt. By the end of 1970,
short-term debt for all manufacturing companies accounted for just
under 26 per cent of all debt but many individual companies were
still burdened with immense masses of short-term. borrowings. These
indicate that long-term debt may seriously understate the burdens
that some companies are actually carrying.
3.24 Medicine They Could Not Swallow
Corporate financial officers are very careful towards increasing
layers of short-term debt. The recession brought on an epidemic of
slow pay fever, and the burden of financing receivables has grown
accordingly. It can be argued, of course, that more companies should
have cut their dividends and shaved their capital expenditures but
many could not accept the need for such strong medicine. Instead they
felt obliged to maintain their normal payouts and to go ahead
with their investment plans--and met the cost by borrowing short-
term. Another alternative is by means of entering the long-term
debt market. The major problem has been interest rates which until
the middle of 1970 acted as if they would never stop rising. Many
51
companies have found those rates hard to stomach, as long-term
commitments. Companies paying 9 per cent for the debts found that
they could not actually earn that much on the assets. In 1970 about
200 of the 500 largest industrials did not make 9 per cent on the
asset.
Perhaps taking 9 per cent as an example is too low for some
companies. Boise Cascade issued US$75 million of debentures at a
10 per cent rate. Ryder System got long-term money at an 111 per
cent rate in November. American Airlines was compelled to pay 10
per cent to finance new equipment.
Some of the debts on the books of many companies were borrowed
in periods of much lower interest rates. However, the gap between
the current and embedded rates narrows as low interest bonds are
retired and replaced.
Between 1965 and 1970 interest payments made by all non-financial
corporations rose from US$12 billion to almost US$28 billion. This
shows an increase in debt outstanding and a rise in interest rates.
At the same time, interest as a proportion of pre-tax operating
profits jumped from 16 per cent to 32 per cent.
As a sort of informal protest against high debt, the Securit-
ies and Exchange Commission required that most bond prospectuses
include a five-year record of the ratio of earnings to fixed charges.
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3025 The Importance of netting an A
During the period of the credit crisis, bond holders insisted
on quality more than ever: an A rating or better. The companies
at the bottom of the pile, with ratings, had trouble getting money.
Statistical figures from Salmon Brothers indicated that in
recent years bonds rated lower than A have accounted for as much as
20 per cent of the total raised by bond sales. In 1970 it was down
to 11 per cent. In normal times, BBB industrial bonds tend to sell
about fifty to seventy-five basis points. (a basis point is 1/100th
of a percentage point) above AA utility bonds but because of the
nervous investors, who are pressing for higher quality, it increased
to an incredible 280 basis points in June 1970, and recently it was
still above 100 points. Some BBB companies have approached the
market only to decide that rates there are unacceptable.
Evans Products intended to sell US$90 million securities but
found that the bonds could not be sold at less than 9 per cent
L-„ i-horPfnrf- r3Prided to increase the number of stocks to be sold.
A good rating not only attracts the public o?zering, but also
the private lenders, e.g., insurance companies and pension funds
have been so pleased with the yield of the high-quality stocks, that
they are unwilling to consider any that bear greater risk. The
business sector had strong affection for the letter A. Some
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companies privately cancelled their bond selling plans, if they were
rated BBB or Baa by one or tvvo rating agencies. Some even assumed
that it was better for them to stay away from the rating agencies,
and hoped that the agencies would not notice that its debt ratio
did not merit an A.
3.26 The Pressure to Rent
It is common for the retail industry to lease stores, for air-
lines to lease planes, and for all sorts of companies to lease
warehouses. By so doing the companies save a lot of capital invest-
ments which,'by their debt appearance, may cause harmful results on
the balance sheet. The rating agencies did take this into consider-
ation, but lease obligations carried less of an onus for a company
than debt obligations. That is why two utility companies, Duke
Power and Consolidated Edison, who were in trouble with ratings,
changed from owning to leasing.
3.27 Why Equity Was "Inconvenient"
There is no way for the utilities to please all people. Most
regulatory commissions that set rates have insistently urged the
utilities to keep their debt up so as to reduce the cost. Debt
capital will clearly be cheaper than equity capital, for stock
investors will not be willing to put their money at risk unless they
see themselves as earning a premium over the rates being paid to
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bond investors. On the other hand, the rating agencies have
cautioned the utilities to keep their debt down, so as to protect
the bondholders. Paul H. Elick, Executive Vice-President of SCI'
Corporation, allowed his debt ratio to be increased to 46 per cent,
which he commented should not be so high. He started the reason for
doing so as, "Our attempt was to forstall equity financing at times
that seemed inconvenient to us."
The second year SCM had dismal profits, the Company could not
pay any dividends nor could it issue commerical paper or even think
of expanding. A few operations were also sold as a result of
wrong acquisitions. There was no resistence to equity financing,
but the stock price dropped from eighty-three in 1966 to around
twenty in April 1971. Other debt-choked companies like the Rapid
American, 1.1,eshulam Riklis eliminated their dividends to conserve
cash. Whittaker Corporation even sold 25 of its 105 divisions to
get the necessary working capital.
3.28 A Very Seductive Concept
The credit crisis had long-range effects on the corporations.
Many companies discovered that their management decisions were
previously dictated strictly by money considerations. They sold
divisions because they had to raise cash. They avoided capital
expenditures because they had to conserve cash.
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Meanwhile the financially strong companies were allowed by the
bond market to obtain long-term financing with which to pay 6ff their
short-term borrowings and build up their liquid assets. The weaker
companies were still suffering from the burden of short-term debt
and the shortage of cash. Even when the market began to roar upward,
yet in spite of the lack of cash, there would be no chance to meet
the financing demands the boom would impose. The best hope was that
the economy would recover slowly so that they could wait for their
chance to increase their strength of capital.
It is difficult to say how much can be learnt from the lesson of
the credit crisis. Leverage is a very seductive concept, and it
might easily gain back admirers in the euphoria of another boom.
Some of to-day's beaten-down executives stoutly insist that they will
not again be caught in such a trap, while others still do not
understand where they went vrrong. An executive of one highly troubled
company says, "We would have been okay if our earnings forcasts
had been right."
29 Conclusion
We have seen what a bitter lesson the U.S. companies nave
learned. The theory of leverage is a problem seriously discussed
and argued among corporate executives. Leverage when it is used
adequately can increase profitability, but when it is used in wrong
companies and at wrong times, it can also lead to disaster.
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It is true that Chinese businessmen on the whole are more
conservative in their financial structures but in a place like
Hong Kong, where the traditional business environment is continually
open to the influence of the West, it is quite interesting to
investigate the attitude of businessmen here, towards leverage, and
also their opinions on financing their companies through debt.
"The lesson of the credit crisis" stimulates us to think more
about leverage. We do not have to learn everything by experience
we can try to avoid what others have suffered, We hope our Hong
Kong companies can take the U.S. credit crisis as a lesson, and
avoid falling into such a painful trap.in the future.
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III
1. Maynard, H. B. Handbook of Business Administration, 1968.
20 Donaldson, Elvin F. and Pfall, John K. Corporate Finance
Policy and Management, second edition.
3. Total capital is stockholders equity plus long-term liabilities.
4. Loomis, Carol J. The Lesson of the Credit Crisis, Fortune
May, 1971. Vol. LXIII, No. 5. p.141.
5. Same as reference No. 4.
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4.0 DEBT-E,UITY RATIOS OF SELECTED HONG KONG AND U.S. COMPANIES
This chapter deals primarily with figures showing the differ-
ence between Hong Kong companies and American companies in the
scale of using leverage. Figures for the U.S. corporations are
available from the article on "The Lesson of the Credit Crisis"(1),
and also from various issues of Fortune. The companies choosen
are the 500 largest corporations on the Fortune's list. For the
Hong Kong companies, we chose those that are listed on the HOng Kong
Stock Exchange, Limited. Detailed financial figures are available
from the Year Book issued by this company. Vie wrote to these com-
panies asking for their annual reports for the years 1970, 1971, and
1972. Among these 149 listed companies, we received reports from
only 87 companies. Since we are dealing with local companies,
we do not include the fifteen companies that are incorporated out-
side Hong Kong. For the companies whose annual reports we are
lacking, we refer their figures in the Year Book.
4.l Debt-equity Ratios of Selected United States Companies
The year 1970 saw the largest U.S. corporations become more
and more leveraged. Chart 2 is a comparison between the 500 largest
industrial companies for the years 1960 and 1970. The ratio is
defined as long-term, debt being proportion of total capital. The
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DEBT RATIOS OF THE 1500


















companies charted are those that appeared on the 500 list for 1960
and 1970. In each year the data on the chart indicate the number of
companies falling into certain debt-ratio range.
In 1970 many more companies were in the higher range. Only
19 (versus 83 in 1960) had no debt at all, while 106 (versus 24 in
1960) had debt ratios of more than 40 per cent. Those three high
flyers whose ratios at the end of their 1970 fiscal year were over
80 per cent are all conglomerates: Ling-Tenco-Vought with a debt
ratio of 88.5 per cent General Host with 85.5 per cent and Rapid-
American with 81.7 per cent. All three companies, of course, used
their leverage to finance acquisitions. However, after 1970 they
were striking for debt reduction. The company with the highest
debt ratio in 1960-the figure was 74.1 per cent, was Commonwealth
Oil Refining. The company ended 1970 with a debt ratio just above
40 per cent.
The one hundred companies on Tables lj and 14 are Lhe ones
among Fortune's 500 that had the highest and the lowest ratios of
long-term debt to total capital in 1970. The debt figures include
all obligations, secured and unsecured, that had more than one year
to run. All together, the five hundred largest industrials carried
US$7 5.7 billion in total long-term debt in 1969, a jump of US 9.8
billion or 14.9 per cent. The average five hundred companies had
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TABLE 13
COMPANIES WITH THE HEAVUEST DEBT
Debt as percent long-term debt Total caapital





849,50569.4 589,7795. Loew's Theatre
155,458105,13467.66. Dayo
129,09885,15466.07. Schaefer (F. & M.)
271,41164.2 423,0088. Crane
11552,46662.0 962,4009. Gulf ''ie stern Industries
74)51660.5 45,05710. Microdot
124,77860.4 75,1,2611. 11,ard Foods
2,867,505 4,814,52012. General Telephone Electronics 59.6
199,751 339,67958.813. Trans Union
178,115 304,67458.514. Evans Products
754, 074436,72015. International Utilities 57.9
210,607 367,11116. Revere Copper Brass 57.4
1,840,549 3,212,12157.317. Tenneco
237,672 417, 30118. Coastal States Gas Producing 57.0
249, 606136,84254.819. Granite City Steel
120,91820. U.S. Smelting Refining Mining 221, 36854.6
163,918 301,23854.421. Bangor Punta
111,12354.422. Indian Head 204,458
68, 803 126,69154.323. Fibreboard
1,434,771776,45554.124. Reynolds Metals




186, 58351.7 96,50829, Howmet
36, 499 70,59551.730. Rheingold
7 54, 52051.7 389,77031. Amerada Hess
408, 24932. International Minerals Chemical 51.6 210, 544
287,97051.4 560P08333. General American Transportation
657,29151.2 336,25034. Lockheed Aircraft
178,93350.835. Whittaker 352,247
132,944 263,58950.436. Farmland Industries
69,282 137,80050.337. Penn Dixie Cement
88,608 176,80950.138. National Industries
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39Avco 834,46549.7 414,427
40. Fuqua Industries 85,012 172,63749.2
41. Armstrong 65,95248.7 135.560
42. General instrument 228.839110,90148.5
43. Commonwealth Oil Refining 115,667 238,72248.5
44. Philip Morris 687,80848,3 332,000
45. Rath Packing 8,952 18,55248.3
238.62046, Kidde (waiter) 48.2 494,771
47. Agway 196,21848.0 94,167
48. Celanese 47.9 1,155, 505553,069
49. Ethyl 230,15247.6 483.037
50. Northrop 125,794 265.85447.3
Source: The Far Poles of Leverage, Fortune, May 1970. p.222.
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TA 1L.
COMPANIES INITH LITTLE OR NO SEBT
Debt as percent Long-term debt Total Capital























100 96,754.12, American Chain Cable
106, 072




190,3211.7 3,3016, Wiest Point-Pepperell
129,0122,3151087. Gardner-Denver
403,6541.8 7,3778, Lilly (Eli)
199,8331.9 3,7299. Eltra
108,9042,1091.910, Inland Container
238, 0012.0 4,78111. Freeport Sulphur
207, 4722.212. Donnelley (R.R.) Sons 4.534
1,006,18122,32413. Minnesota Minning Manufacturing 2.2
286,7856,3872.214. Mcgrqw-Edison
10,9582.3 481339215. American Home Product
2,0082.6 78.748816. Hormel (Geo. A.)
817802.7 322,04217. Libbey-Owners-Ford
2.8 10,802 386,60218. Armstrong Cork
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405.67413,99023. Johnson & Johnson 3.4
63,3852,2643.624. Allied Mills 664, 69823,95325. American Smelting Refining 3.6
144,0975,5973.926. Hoover
100,9454,42727, Farmers Union Central Exchange 4.4
2,129,87494,2724.428. Eastman Kodak
60.7312,7664.629. Roper
Source: "The Far Poles of Leverage", Fortune, May 1970- Issued monthly
by Time Inc., 541 North Fairbanks Court, Chicago, Illinois
6o6ll. p.222.
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US151,300,000 in outstanding long-term debt, and an average total
capitalization of US$580,800,000. Thus the average percentage of debt
to capital came to 26.1 per cent. As the tables show, Ling-Temco-
Vought had the highest percentage (84.8 per cent) and twenty-one
companies had no long-term debt at all. Among industry groups, eight
metal-manufacturing companies appeared on the list of heavily in-
debted firms while eight electronics and seven drug makers were
among those with the least debt.
Of the most indebted companies, fifteen were among the fifty
firms that had the lowest returns on total capital in 1970. And
six of these, including the highest leveragers L-T-V and Warwick
Electronics, had losses for 1969. None of the fifty most leverages
firms was among those top performers in return on capital.
On the list of leastu leveraged companies, twenty-three, or
nearly half, were among the fifty industrials that had the highest
rates of return on capital for 1969. Eleven of these had no debt
at all. Skyline placed first in return on capital, with a yield of
40.9 per cent. None of the least leveraged companies were among the
fifty firms that showed the lowest return on capital.
4.2 Debt-Equity Ratios of Selected Hong Kong Companies
Most of the Hong Kong companies are bound by their traditional
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conservative type of management policy and are unwilling to commit
themselves to high-debt financial structures. There are many reasons
for their reluctance to acquire long-term loans. In 1970, 125 out
of 134 companies that are incorporated in Hong Kong and are listed
in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Ltd., had no long-term debt at all
(see Table 15). However, the number of these companies decreases
slowly through 1971 (114 companies) and 1972 (106 companies). A
majority of the companies which had long-term debts fall within the
low range of 1 per cent to 20 per cent of the debt ratio. The two
companies with an outstandingly high ratio in 1970 were the
China Underwriter Life and General Insurance Company Limited (with
a debt ratio of 77 per cent), and the Sincere Company Limited (with
a debt ratio of 43 per cent). The former company still maintained
a very high ratio in 1971 (77 per cent) and 1972 (72 per cent).
But the Sincere Company had a sudden substantial decrease in its
debt ratio which was 8 per cent in 1971, and only 1 per cent in 1972.
In 1972, we see an increasing number of companies moving towards
a high debt policy. Among these are the Express Shipping and
Investment Company Limited (59 per cent), the Orient Overseas
Container (Holdings) Limited (70 per cent), Ocean-L4nd Development
Limited (46 per cent), the China Underwriter Life and General Insur-
ance Company Limited (72 per cent), and the New Century Shipping
and Investment Company Limited (63 per cent). However, the number




FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: DEBT-EQUITY RATIO
(Financial Years 1970- 1972)
Number of Firms
Debt-Equity Ratio 197219711970
No debt 125 114 106
2 10.01- .049 5
81.05- .090 3
1 0.10- .149 4

















134 134 134Total Number of firms
Source: Calculated from the Year Book of the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange, Ltd.
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None of the highly leveraged companies had a rate of return
higher than 20 per cent, for the years 1970, 1971, and 1972.
However, a majority of the Hong Kong companies had rate of return
within this range. The highest rate of return ever recorded in the
years 1969 to 1972, was recorded in 1970 by the Chinese Estates
Limited (79.46 per cent). The second best was recorded in 1970 by
the Vibro (Holdings) Limited. The rate is 74-71 per cent. Table 16
shows the rate of return of the Hong Kong companies listed on the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Limited.
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TABLE 16
FREUENCY DISTRIBUTION: RATE OF ttCI'UttN














00170- 74.9 01075- 79.9
0080 and abovO
1109775Total number o I zirms
Scarce: Calculated from the Year Book of the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange, Ltd.
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5.0EVALUATION AND COMPARISON OF DEEMT-ESUITY RATIOS
Debt policy is always decided by the very top level of manage-
ment of a company. It is true, in general, that financial officers
tend to be more conservative than other executives at the same level
in other phases of the business, and this is true as well in the
extent that they influence debt policy--they may tend to minimize
risks, regardless of the potential rewards from risk bearing. There
is no doubt that human characteristics play an important role in
the process of choosing a suitable debt policy. Executive who
are brought up and educated in different cultures, have different
attitudes towards debt and also towards the degree of risk they
are willing to take. It is not so easy to predict the suitability
of a debt policy on a long-term basis. Debt policy, when use
adequately, has to be adjusted according to the changes in the
economy. A debt policy which is adequate in a period of expansion
may not be at all suitable at a time of recession.
5.1 Reasonable Debt-Equity Ratio
Although a reasonable debt policy is hard to define, there are
several points which may guide financial managers in evaluating
their choice of debt ratios.
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5.11 Earning Coverage Ratio
This is the ratio of net income available for debt servicing
to the total amount of annual interest plus sinking fund charges(l).
Under such a rule, no new long-term debt would be contemplated
unless the net income available for debt servicing is equal to or
in excess of some multiple of the debt servicing charges--say three
to one, so that the company can survive a period of decline in sales
and earnings and still have enough earnings to cover the fixed
charges of debt.
4.12 Cash Adequacy
What are the chances of the business running out of cash in
the foreseeable future? First, it is necessary to specify whether
the company's concern is running out of cash, (cash insolvency) or
merely the risk of cash inadequacy, i.e., running out of cash for
certain purposes considered essential to management (for example,
a minimum dividend on common stock)(2). However, for most mature
and normally profitable and well managed companies, its chief concern
is with what might happen during a general or industry recession
when sales and profits are depressed by factors beyond the immediate
control of management. Thus a margin should be set for cach
reserves to avoid the risks of having cash insolvency.
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5.13 Capitalization Standard
Since the ratio is debt versus equity, the choice of capital
must be taken into consideration. Certain items in the stockholders
equity such as preferred stocks, have claim over the assets before
the common stockholders. If a high percentage of this capital
appeared in the balance sheet, the ability to acquire long-term debt
would be weakened(3). It is apparent that in order to formulate a
company's debt standard as a percentage of capitalization, the
standard must be expressed in terms of data which can be related to
the magnitude of the risk in such a way that the changes in the ratio
can be translated into changes in the risk of cash inadquacy, and
vice versa(4). But we wonder how many executives concerned with this
problem today have any real idea of how much the risk of cash
inadequacy is increased when the long-term debt of their company is
increased to a higher level in percentage of capitalization.
5.2 Comparison of Uebt iquity Policies usea by U.S. anu nucig r,uiit
Companies
As we noted before, the choice of a debt-equity ratio is influen-
ced by human characteristics, culture, internal and external environ-
ment, and the nature of the business itself. Different people have
different attitudes towards debt. Different countries of different
cultures may have distinctly opposite attitude towards debt. It is
for this reason that we compare here a number of factors which may
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create sharp differences. Hong Kong, though a British Colony, is
mainly a Chinese society. Less than 10 per cent of the total
population is composed of non-Chinese inhabitants. In many ways
the Hong Kong people are westernized, but the characteristics of
being Chinese still remain. TJae techniques used in many business
concerns, then, are borrowed from the western civilization, yet
their deep-rooted Chinese nature still masters their behavior in
one way or the other.
The United States is a typical example of western civilization.
Many of the scientific discoveries and inventions are from this
country. Their books in science and business are read and taught
by scholars in different countries. They have the largest business
organisations in the world. In many ways, they tend to think
differently fror. those who are brought up under the eastern culture.
In Chapter 4 we saw that the American companies used a higher debt
ratio than the business organisations in Hong Kong. But in 1970,
many American companies suffered as a result of the Credit Crisis.
It is not our purpose here to evaluate the good and the bad
points of these two cultures. Instead, we want to compare what
causes the differences in their attitude towards debt policy as
a means of financing corporate growth.
5,3 Factors Affecting the Folicy Chosen
745,31 Political
In a country where there is a stable and strong government, the
people will invest as much as they can in their business with faith--
as long as the business looks good and the rate of return is attractive
enough. However, in a place like Hong Kong, where her ownership
depends upon the attitude of a strong neighbour, the people have no
sense of belonging(5). It is difficult to imagine that the people
would put all their money into long-term investment. So it can be
understood why Hong Kong businessmen are looking for short-term
profit rather than long-term return.
The cause of this attitude is mainly because of ner nisLory.
Hong Kong was ceded to Britain in 1841 in the course of the First
Opium 'ar of 1839- 41 and was later ratified in the Treaty of
Nanking in 1842. In a similar manner, the Kowloon Peninsula and
Stonecutters' Island were also occupied by Britain during the Second
Opium War of 1856- 58 and were later recognized by the Ching Dynasty
in the First "Convention of Peking in 1860. In 1898, the New Territor-
ies were leased to Britain, on a 99-year term under the Second Convent=
ion of Peking. Consequently most of the land area of Hong Kong
is due to revert to China in 1997 while Hong Kong Island and Kowloon
Peninsula are theoretically British in perspetuity."(6)
However. Peking has always maintained that Hong Kong and La cau
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are part of China, and the problem, of their return will oe seLLlea
in an appropriate way when conditions are ripe.
The lesson learnt in 1949, when the Communists took over China,
caused the businessmen to hesitate in making long-term investments
in Hong Kong. There remains a question: How long before the
Communists will come and tbke over Hong Kong? There is tacit
understanding among the residents that Peking could take Hong Kong
with a telephone call(7). If Hong Kong is becoming of less use to
Peking, the Corununists would not stand for the humiliation of seeing
Hong Kong, as a part of China, lying in the hands of the British(8).
Again the lease of the New Territories will be ended in 1997--
twenty-four years from now. However twenty-four years is not too
long a period, and Hong Kong's businessmen are afraid that they
will become penniless like the landlords of China did in 1949.
They want to make sure that they can easily move their capital out
of Hong Kong in a moment of emergency. Even many of the foreigners
in Hong Kong share .more or less the same opinion. The riot which
we-experienced in 1967, caused a lot of frightened Chinese and
non-Chinese to flee to other countries. any fixed assets which
could not be turned into cash iraediately were sold later at a
very low price. IvIany foreigners closed their factories and transferred
their capital to other countries. The political uncertainty is the
main factor which causes many investors to avoid lending or borroi!-
ing on a long-term basis.
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Unlike Hong Kong, the United States is much more stable in her
internal and external political situation. All around her border,
there is not a single country which is strong enough to jeopardise
her existence. Her east and west coasts are separated from other
countries by the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans. In largemeasure
the nation has been self-sufficient(9). Being a strong and wealthy
nation, her businessmen feel far more secure in their capital and
investments in their country than do the people of Hong Kong. As
to the foreign investment, the capitalists are again backed up by a
strong government(lO).
Having a strong and stable government, the Americans are more
willing to make plans for long-term investments. They are more
patient than the Hong Kong business people in waiting for the
recovery of their investments
Thus, we can understand how political stability can influence
the decisions of the businessmen in making their long-term financ-
ing policy.
5.32 Cultural Factors
Culture, as defined by social scientists, is the sum total of
the basic assumptions of a people or central core of meanings in
societies(Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtoeck)--a value system.
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It is hardly necessary any longer to demonstrate that there is a
great deal of variability in the life styles of people, especially
so when comparing individuals from different societal backgrounds
such as a Chinese and American (11). It is necessary to disting-
uish those elements in the different societies which account for
the differences in the behavior of their individual memberso
In a Chinese family, the head has the absolute power to command
everything. Even today, Chinese children are still taught absolute
obedience to their superiors without questioning (12). In a tightly
stratified society as in ancient China, where all power was concent-
rated in the hands of the superior, the subordinate learnt that it
could be dangerous to question a decision of the superior.
Hong Kong, though in a sense is westernized, in many respects
the changes are merely in outward appearances. Business is
westernized in all outward respects, but remains utterly Chinese in
its internal organisation, "(13). Many Chinese firms use western
techniques for show window purposes. But internally, traditional
Chinese conservatism still dominates the attitude of the management
in decision-making. The owner and the boss of a Chinese firm has
the absolute power to make every decision. The executives are
either the sons or the relatives of the owner. Thus the organisation
pattern within a Chinese organisation is tightly interrelated in
several senses of the word. They do not want intruders from outside
the organisation to tell them what should be done. Thus the imorove-
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ment of the management efficiency wholly depends upon the one person
at the top.
Americans in general have a mythical image of the individual
modeled after the independent, courageous, self-reliant frontiers-
man (14). Business philosophy in particular had dwelt upon the
ruggedly individualistic element in the American national character(15).
It was the existence of thousands of these centres of independent
enterprise that made the self-regulating economy work. Furthermore,
the strong belief in equality as a law of nature, and the right of
every adult to have an equal voice in making decisions affects the
choice of decisions within a business organisation.
Thus, unlike the Chinese, each individual in an American firm
contributes his opinion towards a project or a decision. The boss
does not position himself high above his employees.
Improvement in a Chinese firm needs to be initiated from the
top, whereas in an American organisation, the initiative of change
may be the other way round.
The aggressive nature of the American businessmen makes them
willing to take more risks and share a higher profit, whereas the
Chinese, in spite of the high rate of return, are reluctant to make
any decision which involves more risk than usaualo
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5.33 Size Distribution
Size and distribution of the companies are both important
because they determine the behavior of firms in the industry, and
that behavior in turn determines the quality of the industry's
performance (16).
Hong Kong industry is essentially composed of many small sized
companies. The big drawback to Hong Kong's industry is its con-
centration of products.in a few sectors, of exports in only a few
major markets, and of workers in a few factories. Hong Kong's
textiles and clothing industries, for example, accounted for 47.7
per cent of the value of domestic exports in 1971. These industries
accounted for 4502 per cent of the manufacturing work forces. About
80 per cent of the industrial work force is concentrated in 20 per
cent of the factories, and 80 per cent of total exports are made
by 11 per cent of the manufacturing concerns. Hong Kong's biggest
market continues to be the U.S., although the FEC is coming closer.
The U.S. took 41.5 per cent of Hong Kong's exports in 1971, and
Testern Europe accounted for slightly more than 30 per cent of
Hong Kong's exports (17).
The large corporations in Hong Kong show a lack of interest in
leveiage. Most of them support their growth with their ov,n retained
earnings. Only three of the nine public utilities have long-term
debt anoearinp on their balance sheets.
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On the contrary, the U.S. large corporations.tend to rely more
on leveraged America has a large scale of heavy industry, and the
bond market was established a long time ago. It is easier for the
business companies in the States to get long-term sources of fund.
The opposing attitudes towards debt of the business community
in these two countries, are due to their differences in political,
cultural, and economic influences. However, a large corporation with
adequate profit should somehow consider expanding with borrowed,
funds. Thus the interest and the right to vote of the common stock-
holders will not be diluted. Furthermore, the excess profits can
be distributed to the stockholders as dividends. In this way, the
stockholders will not only be benefit as a result of the increase
in dividends, but also the price of the stock will go up.
5.3h Availability and Relative Cost of Short-Term and Long-term run u5
The supply of funds in the market, and their relative cost,
have always been considered factors affecting most financial
nnnt.rnllrs in determining their companies' debt policyo
One point we must stress, is that Hong Kong has never intensive-
ly developed as a market for bonds, except for a very small amount
of government bonds which were issued in 1948. A few large cor-
porations did issue bonds for their growth, but these bonds were
sold outside Hong Kong.
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Hong Kong has never really been lacking in short-terra loans.
The Colony is over-crowded with banks. The Hong Kong Government
still maintains her free capital inflow and outflow policy. Hong
Kong is regarded as the best in Southeast Asia for the flow of
capital. The recent establishment of the financial companies
also make money more accessible to the business community.
The sources of long-term loans in Hong Kong were limited almost
to the banks, although recently they have become available through
the financial companies. Although the interest rates for short-term
loans are higher than the long-term debts, most of the Chinese firms
we contacted preferred to use short-term debt rather than long-term
loans.
The financial controller of the Levi Strauses (Far East) Ltd.
said, "The banks are putting too many restrictions on our assets
and working cpaitals if we accept their loans. This will even
cost us more in spite of the higher interest rates of the short-
term loans. However, we try our best to finance our company with
retained earnings."
It is not extraordinary to find short-term and long-term
securities in the U.S. market. In fact the market for commerical
paper, i.e., short-term unsecured notes, had an enormous growth in
1960. In 1970, some 575 non-bank issuers had US$32 billion worth
of paper out, and bank affiliates had another US$7.6 billion.
As to the long-term debt market, we believe that it is growing at
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an increasing rate. Between 1960 and 1970, it can be seen that the
largest industrial companies made a powerful move toward higher
levels of debt, reaching a point in 1970 at Which no less than 106
companies out of the top 500 had debt ratios exceeding 140 per cent(18).
Thus the availability and the relative cost of loans have some
influence upon the decision of the management in choosing the kind
of debts that are more benefitial to them.
5.35 Nature of Business
It is common that companies that require heavy investment
in their fixed assets are more prone to using long-term debts to
finance their business. The public utilities which are protected
by the franchise from the Government are in a more advantageous
position to finance with loans.
The Hong Kong public utility companies are rather conservative.
This is reflected by the fact that their long-term liabilities
amount to almost nothing of their total assets, (see Table 17).
In the United States the public utilities often incur a high
proportion of debt in respect to their capitalization. For example,
the long-term liabilities/capitalization ratio for the Electric
Utilities were 0.5 and 0.52 at the end of 1953 and 1963 respectively
(see Table 18). Should preferred stocks be regarded as borrowed
funds, the corresponding ratio would have been 0.63 and 0.62.
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Upon careful examination of the nature of the business of the
companies, we can easily understand why a steel manufacturing
company is different from a trading company in its debt policies.
The difference in the nature of the business makes corporate finan-
cial managers make appropriate decisions on debt policies suitable
only to their own companies.
5.36 Size of the Company
By the term size, here, we mean the capital of the company,
the number of employees, and the quantity of sales. The size of
the company affects its ability to acquire loans from the market.
The larger the size of a company, the better is its capability of
obtaining loans. As a matter of miminizing risk, of which most
of the money lenders are constantly aware, the banks are more
willing to lend money to the large corporations. Bonds of large
corporations are also welcomed by many individual investors.
In the United States, the large corporations are more active
in taking on an additional layer of debts than the smaller ones.
In Hong Kong, on the other hand, we find only a few large companies
with long-term debts on their balance sheets. This shows that
although the size of the company determines the ability of the
company to acquire loans, the decision to use debt as a means of
financing its growth still depends upon the attitude of the manage-
ment and the economic conditions,
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THE HONG KONG PUBLIC UTILITY CUT N 15
(1970- 1972)
Stockholders equity/Long-term liabilities/
total capitalization ratioLotal capital ratio
Company
1970 1970 1971 19721971 1972
0 1,00 1.00 1.0000China Light Power
09797 1199.03001China Motor Bus .03
1.00 1000 1.0000Hong Kong China Gas 0
0 1.00 1.00 1.0000Hong Kong Electric
081.80 .83.17 .19Hong Kong Telephone .20
0 1.00 1.00 10000Hong Kong Tramway
0 l.uu 1000 1.00Hong Kong Yaumati Ferry 00
.80 .821.000 .20 .18Kowloon Mlotor Bus
1000 1000 1.000 00Star Ferry




CAPITALIZATION OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN UNITED STATES
19b3(in31,1953ANDECEMBER31,inUSdollars)
De cer^ber 31. 19 53 December 31, 1963
Amount Per Amount PerCapitalization
(000,000) Cent (000,000) Cent
4,, 23.9Long-term Liabilities 8 12,162 50 52
10Preferred Stock 13 4, 5073,115
Common Stock Euity 9.127 37 17.155 38
24,404 100 100Total 45,131tirl
Source: John,''. Bowyer, Jr., Investment Analysis and lulanaFement
(3rd ed., Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966). p. 309.
DECEMBER 31, 1953 AND DECENBER 31,
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5.37 Attitude of Management
Although a lot of modern techniques are taught in finance text
books to analyse and evaluate a company's possibility of using
debt, even when the results of the analysis show that the company
should move towards using debt, the final decision as to use debt
still depends upon the attitude of the management. The manager's
attitude is determined by his background in education, culture, and
family as well as his own personal characteristics. Thus managers
who were educated and raised in different countries are likely to
have different attitudes towards corporate debt financing.
5.33 Conclusion
As a conclusion, the various factors above which in one way or
another influence the policy of debt-equity ratio are mainly due
to social and economic variance. The comparison contributes to our
systematic understanding of the social and economic structure of
the corporations of two different nations, especially Hong Kong
and the U.S.A.
The implication of this study is at least two-fold. First, as
for the influence of the social factors, we suggest that the relat-
ionship may be strong and positive among industrial units in the
developing world, which is characterized by a large number of small
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and medium-sized industries. The cultural, political and personal
attitude of management are important factors in determining
businessmen's policy towards debt. Second, the economic structure
and functional activities of the companies, such as the mode of
technology, nature of business and size of capital, share in in-
fluencing the policy. We find that both the social and economic
structures have different effects on the policy of using debt in
the eastern and western societies.
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6.0 CONCLUSION AND RECONM BNDATONS
6.1 Discussion with Hong Kong Business People (Factors Affecting
Debt-Equity Policies of the Hong Kong Companies)
As we have mentioned in Chapter 5, the factors which influence
the degree of debt used in the Hong Kong companies are divided
mainly into social and economic categories. To conclude our study,
we have summed up the opinions of the business people in Hong Kong.
One significant feature of the Hong Kong market is the almost
complete lack of corporate fixed interest capital or convertible
securities. This is partly the result of the low rate of corporate
taxation in Hong Kong, which makes fixed interest capital relatively
less attractive to companies than equity capital, but also reflects
the general attitude of Hong Kong investors, who, to date, have
tended to look to the stock market to provide capital or dealing
with short-term profits, rather than long-term investment.
Many of the businessmen are aware of the unstable political
situation and the uncertain future of Hong Kong. This is the
biggest problem hindering most businessmen in making any long-
term plans. Some of them even hinted that they would rather
diversify their investment in other parts of Southeast Asia, like
in Singapore and Taiwan. Thus, they are reluctant to put or invest
all their money here in Hong Kong. Furthermore, Hong Kong has never
91
diversify their investment in other parts of Southeast Asia, like
in Singapore and Taiwan. Thus, they are reluctant to put or invest
all their money here in Hong Kongo Furthermore, Hong Kong has never
been a place for heavy industries many local manufacturers can
afford to support their expansion with internal sources of funds.
Only those small manufacturers who cannot afford the money for their
urgent expansion will look for money from outside the company.
It is very difficult for small and medium-sized companies to
get enough needed funds without submitting themselves to very strict
regulations from the lender. Unless there is no other way, this
group of companies will not seek help from these money lenders. Thus
the size of the company affects its ability to obtain loans from
the public.
Many Chinese in Hong Kong today share the perspective that
to be a chicken mouth is better than to be an oxtail, "or in other
words, to be an employed worker will lead nowhere." This indicates
that the Chinese have a strong spirit of independent entrepreneurship.
As a consequence, the local Chinese would tend to build himself his
own shop, even though he has a limited amount of capital and the
size of the shop is very small. These bosses lack the management
training that is essential for making financial decisions. Very
often the boss of this kind of company, makes all decisions for the
company, without necessarily being qualified. Thus his attitude
really dictates his preference for the kind of debt policy he will
choose.
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The rules of most banks are very strict. Although they now
play a very important role in helping Hong Kong industries, they
are reluctant to finance individuals who have not proved their
productive efficiency, managerial skill, and knowledge of raw mat-
erial prices and trends. The commonly known sources of finance to
medium and small sized factories are the Chinese banks and private
financiers. Commerical banks supply only a limited amount of loans.
It seems, however, that many industrialists have to turn to "black-
market sources: "hot money which moves around in times when there.
are economic and political changes in the sourrounding areas and
for which interest rates up to30 per cent a month are charged.
There are many factors that cause the differences in managers'
attitude towards debt policies. However, the main reasons are
those summarized above.
6.2 Recommendations
As we mentioned in Chapter 1, the purpose of this thesis is
to compare the debt-equity ratios of selected Hong Kong and U.S.
companies. In this concluding section, we venture a few suggest-
ions, based on our findings, with the aim of improving the debt
versus equity concept for the companies in Hong Kong.
1. We would suggest that the Hong Kong companies have plans
long-term investment, as the political situation is more stable now.
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Recently, the Hong Kong Government declared that it would in the
near future impose rates on land in the New Territo rie s e A s a
matter of fact, many land owners in the New Territories are still
holding the certificate of land ownership issued during the Ching
Dynasty. Before making this decision, the Hong Kong Government must
have an agreement with China. The building of the underground
traffic system also suggests that the Hong Kong Government and the
foreign investors have confidence in Hong Kong's future.
2. Financing corporate growth with long-term loans results in
more cost-saving for the companies than using other sources of funds.
-However a detailed and clear analysis of the company's financial
structure should undertaken as an aid to decision making. The
question of debt capacity is essentially an internal one to be
settled by management with reference to its individual circumstances
and individual preferences.
3. Current rules of thumb regarding debt capacity are seriously
inadeauate as a framework for this decision.
4. A knowledge of the behavior of cash flows and a useful
measure of the capacity to assume incremental fixed cash outflows are
necessary.
5. Management needs approaches that will enable it to approximate
their firm's capacity within the context of data with which it is already
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familiar, and in terms of, ud rents to which it has long been accus
tomed.
6. More effort should be applied to cost-saving types of capital
investment. The coiipany's stockholders would benefit more if a
satisfactory profit could be provided through a reduction in the
cost of investments,
7. A well-planned information system should be set up within
the company, inviting suggestions from employees at all levels.
This system may be a fertile.sources of ideas for cosys`lviirlg types
of projects.
8. We would like also to suggest that each company ought Lo
establish a central unit responsible for evaluating all investment
proposals, and to evaluate the use of different sources of funds to
finance the project. Thus, the system would minimize the bias in
the analyses provided by the proposing departments. Members of this
unit should include men of different educational background.
As a conclusion, the above recommendations are based on our
observations and judgnlent. However, as we mentioned before, there
is no ideal debt-equity ratio for any particular industry. It is
by no means easy to evaluate and to arrive at any optimal solution.






1. How does your company define the term "debt-equity ratio"?
2, In what way does your company think loan is important for
the growth of your company?
3. Does your company have long-term planning? What time
periods are involved?
4. What does your company think about Hong Kong's prospects
in the near future? 1,11hat about Hong Kong's long-term
future? How do these thoughts affect your company's
planning for the future?
5. How do ideas for investments originate in your company?
6. Does your company have a system to encourage investment
ideas?
7. Does your company have long-term loans in your capital
structure? If yes, who authorized the decision to use
debt?
8. How many employees you have in your company?
B. Authorization Control
1, Does your company have any procedures to evaluate the cost
of capital?
2. What procedures are followed in authorizing the execution
of an approved capital investment project?
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3. How far is cash budgeting important in your company? Is
there any procedure to measure cash adequacy?
4. Does your company have a finance department?
C. Financing
1. How many kinds of security does your company have?
'2. What is your opinion on selling bonds to acquire funds?
3. What are your sources of funds in making your previous
investments?
4. Do you think short-term and long-term funds are easily
available for businessmen in Hong Kong?
6. How far do you think the banks are helpful to finance the
growth of Hong Kong industries?
7. If you can afford to finance the investment internally, will
you consider to look for other sources of funds which may
be cheaper than your internal source of funds?
8. What would your company do if there were several investment
proposals satisfying your criteria and there were not
sufficient funds available to do them all?
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1論文撮要　　　　　　　　　 凌 乃 成
香 港 與 美 國 類 似 公 司 之 負 債 對 股 東 權 益 比 率 之 比 較
香 港 與 美 國 是 兩 個 不 同 典 型 的 社 會 ， 無 論 在 文 化 ， 經
濟 結 構 ， 和 人 民 的 觀 念 上 ， 均 有 極 顯 著 的 不 同 。 本 文 旨 在
探 討 兩 個 不 同 型 態 的 社 會 ， 其 工 商 界 人 仕 對 以 長 期 債 務 □
措 資 金 的 方 法 有 何 不 同 的 態 度 和 意 見 。
所 謂 槓 桿 原 理 或 舉 債 經 營 是 以 借 入 來 經 營 商 業 ，
其 中 有 各 種 方 式 來 利 用 資 金 從 事 商 業 ， 此 種 資 金 淨 以 契 約
方 式 辦 理 ， 包 括 公 司 債 券 ， 非 參 與 性 優 先 股 ， 或 有 限 租 金
2的 貨 租 等 。 當 舉 債 經 營 利 用 借 入 資 本 所 獲 得 的 利 益 大 於 所
酬 支 付 的 利 息 ， 則 此 營 業 獲 利 ； 反 之 ， 在 商 業 蕭 條 行 期 中
， 舉 債 經 營 所 獲 得 的 利 潤 小 於 所 需 支 付 的 利 息 ， 則 此 營 業
將 無 利 潤 可 言 。 基 於 上 述 的 原 因 ， 有 人 謂 舉 債 經 營 盈 餘 之
間 相 去 甚 遠 。
舉 債 經 營 的 優 點 ， 為 每 股 與 僅 以 股 票 集 資 公 司 相 比 較
能 分 配 較 多 的 紅 利 ； 反 之 ， 其 缺 點 則 可 使 紅 利 全 部 損 失 ，
可 以 使 公 司 無 力 還 債 ， 甚 至 破 產 。
適 宜 於 舉 債 經 營 的 情 形 如 下 ：
， 收 益 固 定 的 公 司 較 收 益 波 動 的 公 司 ， 在 舉 債 借 款
3款 方 回 較 為 安 全
超 過 某 一 限 度 ， 使 用 額 外 資 金 所 能 獲 得 的 利 潤 不
比 應 支 付 的 利 息 為 中 ， 此 一 限 度 即 為 使 用 額 外 資
金 的 適 當 水 平 。
借 債 愈 多 ， 則 公 司 所 而 繼 續 支 付 的 債 卷 行 息 亦 愈
大 。 利 息 如 再 上 昇 ， 將 會 抵 銷 舉 債 經 營 所 獲 得 的
利 潤 。 惟 此 一 原 則 不 一 定 是 正 確 的 ， 例 如 一 家 新
興 公 司 可 利 用 舉 債 經 營 方 式 來 不 斷 增 加 其 淨 利 。
一 九 七 ○ 憐 前 ， 美 國 工 商 界 競 相 大 量 舉 債 作 為 公 司 發
展 投 資 之 用 ， 有 些 公 司 其 負 債 對 股 東 權 益 之 比 率 竟 高 達 百
4分 之 八 十 。 若 干 新 經 濟 學 家 認 為 以 美 國 當 時 的 情 形 ， 實 在
不 必 擔 心 經 銷 會 發 生 哀 退 ， 因 此 他 們 積 極 支 持 舉 債 經 粄 的
論 調 ， 事 實 上 ， 一 九 七 ○ 年 美 國 曾 發 生 一 次 極 大 的 資 金 週
轉 危 機 ， 那 些 高 度 舉 債 的 公 司 感 到 極 難 籌 措 現 金 來 支 付 高
額 的 利 息 ， 固 而 紛 紛 實 行 緊 急 措 施 以 應 付 這 次 危 機 ， 例 如
不 發 股 息 ， 出 售 公 司 分 部 以 籌 措 現 金 ， 借 入 短 期 高 息 債 款
等 。 雖 然 如 此 ， 美 國 工 業 仍 然 面 臨 極 艱 苦 的 局 面 ， 幸 好 美
國 政 府 及 時 予 以 援 助 ， 給 予 各 銀 行 全 力 支 持 ， 並 勸 告 各 銀
行 勿 向 工 商 業 者 迫 債 ， 結 果 使 美 國 工 業 界 渡 過 一 次 難 關 。
雖 然 這 是 一 次 教 訓 ， 但 仍 有 很 多 公 司 主 管 不 明 其 所 以 然 ，
5其 中 一 間 深 受 此 害 的 公 司 主 管 說 : 如 果 我 們 當 時 能 正 確 地
預 測 公 司 的 收 益 , 我 們 便 不 會 陷 於 此 困 境 中 。
香 港 各 公 司 的 財 務 管 理 一 各 以 保 守 見 稱 ， 本 文 係 根 據
香 港 証 卷 交 易 所 出 版 之 一 九 六 八 至 一 九 七 二 年 年 刊 ， 獲 錄
其 中 一 百 三 十 四 家 在 本 港 註 冊 的 公 司 作 為 調 查 對 象 ， 加 以
分 析 。 結 果 發 現 在 一 九 七 ○ 年 沒 有 長 期 債 務 的 公 司 有 一 百
二 十 五 家 之 多 ， 佔 該 會 上 市 公 司 之 大 多 數 ， 可 見 香 港 的 公
司 均 非 以 舉 債 作 為 資 金 的 主 要 來 源 。 其 他 少 數 在 財 政 報 表
上 顯 示 有 長 期 債 務 一 項 者 ， 其 負 債 對 股 東 權 益 的 百 分 比 ，
大 部 份 在 百 分 之 一 到 百 分 之 二 十 之 間 ， 其 百 分 比 較 高 者 ，
6為 輪 船 ， 貨 櫃 運 事 ， 及 投 資 公 司 等 。
準 此 ， 美 國 公 司 與 香 港 公 司 在 舉 債 經 營 方 面 有 很 大 差
別 。 本 文 就 政 治 ， 文 化 ， 公 司 與 香 港 規 模 ， 長 短 期 資 金 的 供 應 成
本 ， 公 司 業 務 性 質 ， 以 及 主 管 人 員 的 態 度 分 別 仍 一 比 較 ，
以 尋 求 兩 者 間 的 差 別 原 因 。
政 治 的 不 穩 家 和 香 港 本 來 的 地 位 問 題 ， 是 影 響 各 公 司
避 免 在 香 港 作 龐 大 投 資 的 極 大 原 因 。 香 港 的 公 司 稅 比 美 國
為 低 ， 這 點 使 槓 桿 作 用 起 不 了 多 大 的 作 用 ， 因 為 利 息 可 作
為 費 用 ， 並 得 在 課 稅 前 作 為 收 益 的 減 項 ； 如 在 稅 率 高 的 國
家 ， 此 舉 自 可 使 每 股 得 利 潤 提 高 ， 但 在 稅 率 低 的 地 方 ，
7則 出 入 實 屬 有 限 。 香 港 各 銀 行 對 需 要 長 期 貨 款 者 均 訂 家 嚴
格 的 合 約 ， 以 限 制 公 司 財 務 運 用 的 自 由 ， 諸 如 限 制 利 息 時
派 發 和 限 定 營 運 資 金 的 最 低 額 等 等 均 妨 礙 公 司 財 務 的 靈 活
運 用 ， 很 多 公 司 亦 不 願 公 開 的 資 料 被 揭 發 ， 故 對 銀 行 長 期
資 金 均 採 觀 望 態 度 ， 銀 行 亦 對 那 些 財 務 管 理 不 善 的 公 司 不
予 放 款 ， 結 果 迫 使 若 干 中 小 型 企 業 從 黑 市 方 面 籌 措 資 金 ，
而 黑 市 貸 款 的 利 率 自 遠 較 銀 行 的 行 率 為 高 。
但 若 干 財 務 結 構 嚴 謹 ， 每 年 利 潤 不 菲 的 公 司 ， 亦 抱 著
保 守 的 財 務 政 策 ， 例 如 大 部 份 的 公 用 專 業 ， 對 於 舉 債 經 營
仍 然 裹 足 不 前 。 整 體 來 說 ， 這 些 公 司 長 期 資 金 的 來 源 多 屬
8普 通 股 和 累 積 盈 餘 ， 以 發 行 優 先 股 和 債 卷 來 籌 措 長 期 資 金
可 說 是 絕 無 僅 有 。 目 前 除 了 一 兩 間 香 港 大 公 司 在 海 外 發 行
債 卷 外 ， 其 他 各 公 司 均 無 此 打 算 。
香 港 的 政 治 前 途 目 前 已 比 較 明 朗 代 ， 這 可 從 政 府 所 決
家 進 行 的 幾 個 龐 大 建 設 計 劃 │ │ 如 海 水 化 淡 廠 ， 地 下 鐵 ，
以 及 十 年 房 屋 計 劃 │ │ 看 出 。 政 府 和 民 間 對 香 港 充 滿 一 片
信 心 ， 不 久 前 政 府 且 宣 佈 廷 收 新 界 差 餉 地 價 稅 ， 事 實 上 新
界 很 多 鄉 民 仍 然 持 有 清 朝 的 土 地 証 明 帕 ， 香 港 政 府 為 採 取 這
一 步 驟 前 一 定 與 中 國 政 府 協 同 ， 故 未 來 數 十 年 間 ， 即 使 新
界 租 約 期 滿 ， 香 港 的 前 途 仍 然 樂 觀 。
9從 美 國 一 九 七 ○ 年 的 例 子 來 看 ， 舉 債 經 營 並 不 表 示 一
定 對 公 司 有 利 ， 反 而 濫 用 這 種 財 務 管 理 方 式 可 能 導 致 公 司
週 轉 不 靈 ， 甚 至 破 產 。 故 財 務 管 理 人 員 應 絕 對 了 解 公 司 的
業 務 性 質 ， 企 業 本 身 的 能 力 ， 以 及 社 會 的 經 濟 背 景 ， 然 後
決 定 是 否 採 取 此 種 方 式 。
要 了 解 企 業 的 能 力 ， 必 須 先 設 立 一 間 健 全 的 佈 部 信 息
系 統 ， 使 各 部 門 主 管 的 意 見 能 迅 速 互 相 溝 通 ， 公 司 上 下 能
代 為 一 體 ， 然 後 才 能 綜 合 各 部 門 的 意 見 ， 達 成 最 膏 當 的 投
資 決 策 。
總 括 來 說 ， 任 何 工 商 業 均 很 難 找 出 一 個 絕 對 理 想 的 頁
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漬 對 股 東 權 益 的 比 率 ， 因 為 這 一 比 率 受 環 境 ， 社 會 的 經 濟
發 展 ， 企 業 的 本 身 動 態 ， 政 治 因 素 ， 及 各 管 理 人 員 的 態 度
所 影 響 ， 就 舉 債 經 營 這 一 財 務 管 理 方 式 來 說 ， 一 個 理 想 的
決 策 應 富 有 彈 性 ， 能 配 合 各 種 外 在 內 在 的 變 動 因 素 而 作 合
理 的 調 整 。 美 國 很 多 公 司 在 一 九 七 ○ 年 過 於 溺 這 舉 債 經 營
， 結 果 大 受 其 害 希 望 香 港 各 財 務 人 員 能 以 此 為 前 車 之 鑑 ，
對 以 長 期 債 務 作 為 資 金 來 源 加 以 作 慎 重 考 慮 。


